|:: DK: Om religiøs tolerance
|I det seneste nummer af det britiske tidsskrift ”Philosophy” er en artikel af Habermas: ”Religious Tolerance - The Pacemaker for Cultural Rights”
”Religious toleration first became legally enshrined in Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. Religious toleration led to the practice of more general inter-subjective recognition of members of democratic states which took precedence over differences of conviction and practice. After considering the extent to which a democracy may defend itself against the enemies of democracy and to which it should be prepared to tolerate civil disobedience, the article analyses the contemporary dialectic between the notion of civil inclusion and multiculturalism. Religious toleration is seen as the pacemaker for modern multiculturalism, in which the claims of minorities to civic inclusion are recognized so long as members of all groups understand themselves to be citizens of one and the same political community”.
Philosophy vol. 79 no.1 (2004) pp. 5-18
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Ved Habermas' forelæsning om emnet på Royal Institute of Philosophy i London den 28. marts 2003 blev følgende noter omdelt:
"(1) A brief historical introduction explains the shift away from unilaterally declared religious toleration, the limits of which are defined by the guaranteeing authority, towards religious freedom as an individual right based on mutual recognition. By drawing the line between what is and what is not tolerated, there seems to be an element of intolerance built into any specific regime of toleration. But religious tolerance loses the flair of patronising benevolence as soon as everyone affected can agree on the very conditions under which they wish to exercise mutual tolerance. Tolerance can be guaranteed in a tolerant manner precisely under those conditions (where) the citizens of a democratic community mutually accord one another.
(2) The purported paradox of an intolerant kernel of tolerance appears to re-emerge in the strange dialectics of the self-assertion of militant democracies. Democracy defends political freedom against the enemies of democracy by limiting the scope of their political freedom. Whereas the task of a seemingly paradoxical self-limitation of religious intolerance can be left to democracy, the latter must process the conundrum of constitutional tolerance through the medium of its own laws. In this regard, civil disobedience serves as a litmus test for the political tolerance of the liberal state.
(3) The struggle for religious tolerance was not only the driving force behind the emergence of the liberal state but continues to stimulate its further development up to the present day. This is conceptually explained in terms of the kinds of reasons involved in performing tolerance. Normative reasons for the mutual respect of members of a shared political culture must trump epistemic reasons for rejecting the beliefs of others so the tolerant person accepts a double burden: to pursue the ethos inscribed in her own world view only under conditions of equal rights for all, and to respect within the same limits the ethos of others. This burden is a cognitive one insofar as it calls for developing the moral and legal principles of the secular order from within the view of one¹s own "strong" tradition.
(4) The third kind of reasons are legal ones for excluding intolerant behaviour, they decide who has to accept whose ethos. This is illustrated by several legal cases which moreover explain why the spread of religious tolerance has now become a stimulus for introducing further cultural rights. The recognition of religious pluralism fulfils this model function as it makes us aware to the claims to civic inclusion generally. Standards for civic equality must be met in two dimensions, those of distributive justice and inclusion. Culture rights are introduced with regard to requirements of the latter they are to promote full membership."